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A basic prediction of effcient risk-sharing is that relative consumption growth rates across countries
or regions should be positively related to real exchange rate growth rates across the same areas. We
investigate this hypothesis, employing a newly constructed multi-country and multi-regional data set.
Within countries, we find signifcant evidence for risk sharing: episodes of high relative regional consumption
growth are associated with regional real exchange rate depreciation. Across countries however, the
association is reversed: relative consumption and real exchange rates are negatively correlated. We
identify this failure of risk sharing as a border effect. We find that the border effect is substantially
(but not fully) accounted for by nominal exchange rate variability. We then ask whether standard open
economy macro models can explain these features of the data. We argue that they cannot. To explain
the role of the nominal exchange rate in deviations from cross country consumption risk sharing, it
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Abstract
A basic prediction of e¢ cient risk-sharing is that relative consumption growth rates across
countries or regions should be positively related to real exchange rate growth rates across the
same areas. We investigate this hypothesis, employing a newly constructed multi-country and
multi-regional data set. Within countries, we ￿nd signi￿cant evidence for risk sharing: episodes
of high relative regional consumption growth are associated with regional real exchange rate
depreciation. Across countries however, the association is reversed: relative consumption and
real exchange rates are negatively correlated. We identify this failure of risk sharing as a
￿ border￿e⁄ect. We ￿nd that the border e⁄ect is substantially (but not fully) accounted for by
nominal exchange rate variability. We then ask whether standard open economy macro models
can explain these features of the data. We argue that they cannot. To explain the role of the
nominal exchange rate in deviations from cross country consumption risk sharing, it is necessary
to combine multiple sources of shocks, ex-ante price setting, and incomplete ￿nancial markets.
JEL Classi￿cation: F3, F4
Keywords: Real exchange rate, risk sharing, border e⁄ect, intranational economics
1 Introduction
Many studies of aggregate consumption behavior have documented the failure of naive models
of consumption risk-sharing. This is true both within countries (risk-sharing across provinces or
states) and across countries. Recognizing that relative consumption prices are time-varying leads to
a more elaborate test for consumption risk-sharing, incorporating both within and between country
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1real exchange rates movements. The prediction of this extended model is that relative consumption
growth rates (across regions or countries) are highly correlated with movements in real exchange
rates. We test this hypothesis using a novel multi-country and multi-regional data set. We show
that a sharp dichotomy arises between within-country and across-country comparisons, particularly
for across-country groups that have ￿ exible bilateral exchange rates. Within countries, movements
in real exchange rates tend to support the hypothesis of some (imperfect) risk-sharing. Across
countries however, the real exchange rate plays either no role or a negative role in risk-sharing. This
is essentially the well-known ￿ Backus Smith￿puzzle (Backus and Smith, 1993). This is particularly
true of countries that exhibit substantial ￿ uctuations in nominal exchange rates.1 Thus, the failure
of across-country (as opposed to within-country) risk sharing is proximately due to movements in
nominal exchange rates. Countries (or regions) with ￿xed exchange rates tend to exhibit relative
consumption growth rates that are positively correlated with national (or regional) real exchange
rates. But in countries with substantial ￿ uctuations in nominal exchange rates the correlation
tends to be negative. Can this ￿nding be reconciled with standard models of real exchange rate
determination? This paper is an attempt to resolve this question.
We note that this is not quite the same as an attempt to resolve the Backus-Smith puzzle, or
￿ consumption ￿real exchange rate anomaly￿(see Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2002). Studies
that have o⁄ered convincing resolutions of this anomaly (see below for a discussion) typically do not
make any predictions about the behavior of the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, these studies
imply that the relationship between relative consumption and the real exchange rate should be
una⁄ected by the nominal exchange rate regime.
We begin by providing a comprehensive empirical account of the role of the real exchange rate
in regional and international risk sharing in a large intra-national and international dataset. The
dataset contains consumption and bilateral consumption prices (or real exchange rates) at the
provincial or state level for a group of countries. We show that for all countries in the sample, there
is evidence that the real exchange rate plays a positive role in within country risk-sharing. That
is, consumption growth di⁄erences across provinces or states are positively correlated with bilateral
real exchange rate changes across the same geographical units. But when we include a ￿ border
dummy￿in the risk sharing regression, indicating that relative consumption growth involves com-
parisons across countries, the overall relationship between consumption growth and real exchange
rate changes falls dramatically, and in most cases is negative. Further investigation reveals that
most, (but not all) of this border e⁄ect can be attributed to nominal exchange rate volatility.2
We then ask, are these results consistent with standard models of international risk sharing
and real (and nominal) exchange rate volatility? Most proposed resolutions of the Backus-Smith
anomaly have emphasized the joint role of incomplete markets and shocks which generate strong
income e⁄ects. The intuition is that a country which has a faster growing consumption experiences
an appreciating real exchange rate (e.g. Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc, 2008). But when we extend
1See also Hess and Shin (2010) and Hadzi-Vaskov (2008).
2Note that we refer to the "border" broadly de￿ned as a separation between any two countries.
2the anomaly to encompass both regions within a country, and the importance of the nominal
exchange rate, these explanations are not complete, since in the standard models, these shocks tend
to produce negative consumption real-exchange rate correlations across regions within a country,
or across countries, independently of how the nominal exchange rate is determined. In order to
adequately explain the data, it is necessary to allow for a non-trivial role for the nominal exchange
rate regime in consumption risk-sharing, since the evidence indicates that the failure of risk-sharing
(or equivalently, the large role played by the border) is strongly tied to movements in the nominal
exchange rate.
We show that the standard sticky price international macro model cannot account for these
features of the data. This is because, despite allowing for a non-trivial role for the nominal ex-
change rate regime, the model generically implies that if there is a negative correlation between
relative consumption growth and the real exchange rate, it will occur equally under ￿xed or ￿ exible
exchange rates. In fact, to the extent that states (or provinces) are analogous to countries within a
￿xed exchange rate area, the standard model also predicts a negative correlation between relative
consumption growth and real exchange rates between states; the presence of the nominal exchange
rate in itself does not alter the implication of these models. The essential reason that the standard
sticky price model cannot account for the empirical regularities in the data is that in fact, the
(co)-variance properties of the real exchange rate in this model are only slightly a⁄ected by the
exchange rate regime itself. Essentially the reason is that in these models, although prices are
nominally sticky, they are forward looking, and price adjustment may be substantially enhanced
by the absence of nominal exchange rate adjustment, so that the absence of nominal exchange rate
adjustment is compensated for by additional nominal price adjustment.
The critical requirement in explaining the pattern of correlations in the data is to allow for shocks
which cause relative consumption growth to rise and the nominal exchange rate to simultaneously
appreciate under ￿ exible exchange rates, but which leave relative in￿ ation rates unchanged (or
to increase) under ￿xed exchange rates. The paper goes on to show one way that this can be
done in an amended form of the standard sticky price open-economy framework. We do this by
combining the basic model with a number of elements. In particular, we employ the assumptions
of a) incomplete ￿nancial markets (limited by trade in non-contingent bonds), b) ex-ante staggered
price setting in both countries, and c) ￿ demand-type￿shocks which simultaneously increase relative
consumption while generating a real exchange rate appreciation. We show that this combination
leads to a model in which movements in the nominal exchange rate may be dominated by demand
shocks, causing relative consumption and the real exchange rate to move in opposite directions,
while, controlling for the nominal exchange rate, movements in the real exchange rate attributable
to relative in￿ ation rates lead relative consumption and the real exchange rate to move in the same
direction. If demand shocks play a signi￿cant enough role, then the model predicts that under
￿ exible exchange rates, the correlation between relative consumption growth and the real exchange
rate will be negative. But ￿xing the exchange rate produces a positive correlation.
Thus, in principle, we can answer the question of the title - the role of the border in cross
3country consumption risk sharing is crucially tied to the nominal exchange rate regime, and the
exchange rate displays characteristics in the model which are akin to those seen in the data.
2 Estimating the border e⁄ect
2.1 Key theoretical relationship
In this section, we present a general model of risk-sharing without additional features of production,
sticky prices, etc., that are explored in section (3) below. To obtain key risk-sharing relationships,
consider a multi-jurisdiction (where a jurisdiction may be a country or region) stochastic model.




￿sU(Cj;t+s;￿j;t+s); ￿ < 1
where ￿ is the subjective discount factor, Cj;t denotes a composite consumption good in country j.
Here ￿j;t represents a jurisdiction speci￿c factor which can a⁄ect the marginal utility of consumption,
apart from consumption itself. This could represent pure preference shocks, or movements in work-
hours when households have non-separable utility. De￿ne Pj;t to be the price of a representative
consumption basket in jurisdiction j in period t: Also let S
i;j
t be the exchange rate that converts
prices from country j￿ s currency to country i￿ s currency in period t. If jurisdictions are within
the same country, then S
i;j
t = 1. Then the real exchange rate between any two regions i and j




t Pj;t=Pi;t; or RER
j;i
t = Pj;t=Pi;t if i and j are two
regions in the same country.
Suppose that there is a complete set of state-contingent securities available to households in all
countries. In this case, the key optimality condition is to equate marginal utilities of consumption
across countries (or regions), adjusted for di⁄erences in price levels, evaluated in a common currency:
Uc(Ci;t;￿i;t)RER
j;i
t = Uc(Cj;t;￿j;t): (2.1)
This equation must hold in every date and state of the world, between any two countries or regions
i and j. It says that in equilibrium, consumption between households i and j must be allocated in a
way that marginal utility (converted into the same units using the real exchange rate) is equalized
across countries. Say now that ￿j;t = 1 for all t:3 Then if utility is of a constant relative risk aversion








or equivalently in logs
￿ (lnCi;t ￿ lnCj;t) = lnRER
j;i
t :
3In the simplest version of the theoretical model below, we will re-introduce preference shocks.
4The expression above must also hold in growth rates:
￿ (￿lnCi;t ￿ ￿lnCj;t) = ￿lnRER
j;i
t ; (2.2)
where ￿lnXi;t = lnXi;t ￿ lnXi;t￿1. These expressions establish the close relationship between
the real exchange rate and relative consumption between jurisdictions i and j: In particular, it
implies that consumption growth between t ￿ 1 and t should be relatively higher in jurisdictions
whose real exchange rates depreciate during the same period. Therefore, if markets are complete,




Ci;t); should be equal to 1, as pointed out by
Backus and Smith (1993) and Kollmann (1995). A version of condition (2.2), de￿ned in terms of
conditional expectations, will also hold even under incomplete markets, so long as some ￿nancial
assets can be traded across countries (see e.g. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1996)). Notice that if relative
purchasing power parity (PPP) holds, so that RER is constant, then ￿lnRER
j;i
t = 0: In this
case we get a standard risk-sharing result that consumption growth rates should be equal across
jurisdictions. This simple implication has been tested extensively in the cross-country context in
Asdrubali, Słrensen, and Yosha (1996), Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001), Bayoumi and Klein
(1997), Hess and Shin (1998), Del Negro (2002), Van Wincoop (1995), Crucini (1999), and others.
2.2 Evidence from US states and Canadian provinces
Equation (2.2) gives us the key testable relationship implied by the model. As is clear from (2.2),
the condition can be applied to any two locations of interest: countries, regions, states/ provinces/
prefectures, etc. We use this relationship to study the extent of national and regional risk-sharing
between the US, Canada, Germany, Japan and Spain.4 We begin by focusing on just the US and
Canada. This allows us to investigate the impact of the border on risk sharing in a similar manner
to studies of deviations of the law of one price across regions within the US and Canada (Engel
and Rogers (1996), Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009)). In the next sub-section we investigate the
same question for all ￿ve countries in our sample.
We employ intra-national data on consumption, output and prices in 50 US states during 1969-
2006 and in 12 Canadian provinces and territories during 1981-2007.5 Using this data we compute
all possible unique bilateral pairs of di⁄erences between log consumption, price and output growth
rates. The pairs of states within the US we denote by UU, the pairs of provinces within Canada
￿ by CC and state-province pairs by UC. The summary statistics for our two-country dataset
are reported in Table 1. Note that, as to be expected, within country real exchange rates are
much less volatile than across country real exchange rates. Table 1 also reveals another interesting
characteristic of our intra-national data: Standard deviation of relative consumption growth within
4These are the countries for which we found historical jurisdiction-level data on consumption and prices. Details
on data sources are provided in the Appendix A.1.
5For the US we use retail sales to proxy for private consumption; we construct state-level price indices using
consumer price index (CPI) for main metropolitan areas and rural/urban prices; and use Gross State Product to
measure output in the 50 states. In all other countries we use ￿nal consumption and output from regional accounts
and regional consumer price indices. Data details are provided in the Appendix A.1.
5the US and Canada is signi￿cantly higher than the standard deviation of their relative price growth,
while the opposite is true for cross-border location pairs.
Table 1: Sample summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Panel 1: US
￿lnCi;t ￿ ￿lnCj;t 41650 0.0001 0.0551 -0.4472 0.3859
￿lnYi;t ￿ ￿lnYj;t 41650 0.0000 0.0457 -0.3624 0.4277
￿lnRER
j;i
t 41650 -0.0001 0.0117 -0.0922 0.0999
Panel 2: Canada
￿lnCi;t ￿ ￿lnCj;t 1674 0.0015 0.0182 -0.0680 0.1114
￿lnYi;t ￿ ￿lnYj;t 1674 0.0020 0.0557 -0.2988 0.4390
￿lnRER
j;i
t 1674 0.0006 0.0095 -0.0331 0.0342
Panel 3: US-Canada
￿lnCi;t ￿ ￿lnCj;t 13000 -0.0025 0.0432 -0.2852 0.3662
￿lnYi;t ￿ ￿lnYj;t 13000 0.0042 0.0515 -0.2815 0.7279
￿lnRER
j;i
t 13000 0.0009 0.0551 -0.1604 0.1588
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of the presented variables for three samples: all US-US state
pairs (Panel 1); all Canada-Canada province pairs (Panel 2); all US-Canada pairs (Panel 3). Obs. refer to
the number of observations in each sample; Mean - sample average; Std. Dev. - sample standard deviation;
Min-sample minimum; Max-sample maximum.
To simplify our notation we will use ￿c
i;j
t to denote relative consumption growth between two
locations i and j; so that ￿c
i;j
t = ￿lnCi;t￿￿lnCj;t; and ￿e
j;i
t to denote real exchange rate growth




t : Then based on equation (2.2) we posit the
following speci￿cation to link relative consumption growth and real exchange rate growth:
￿c
i;j









t is the error term arising due to preference shocks, measurement error, etc. borderi;j is
the border dummy that takes value of one for all UC location pairs, and a value of zero otherwise.
This allows us to focus on the distinction between cross country risk sharing and cross region risk
sharing.
This speci￿cation restricts the relationship between the real exchange rate and relative con-
sumption to be the same for any two locations in the US, in Canada or any two locations between
the US and Canada. However, it is plausible to posit that the same change in the real exchange rate
could be associated with di⁄erent movements in relative consumption depending on the particular
locations observed. In the theoretical model below for instance, we allow for preference shocks
which may di⁄er between any two locations. But more generally there may be di⁄erences in the
degree of openness in goods or ￿nancial markets between two jurisdictions that are not re￿ ected
in changes in the real exchange rate. Distance represents a natural explanatory variable in the
studies of the deviations from the law of one price between location pairs. In terms of deviations
from risk sharing, distance may seem somewhat less compelling, since a) it may already be incor-
porated in the movement in real exchange rates, and b) it is a constant, and may not a⁄ect the risk
sharing relationship when measured in growth rates. Nevertheless, some studies (e.g. Portes and
Rey (2005), Okawa and van Wincoop (2010)) have documented the explanatory power of gravity
6type variables in accounting for ￿nancial market integration. To allow for this, we thus amend the
basic relationship so as to allow for a distance measure, as in the gravity literature. Our benchmark
model speci￿cation thus becomes
￿c
i;j




t ￿ borderi;j) + ￿3￿e
j;i
t ￿ ln ~ di;j + v
i;j
t ; (2.3)
where ln ~ di;j is the normalized log distance between any two locations i and j; de￿ned as ln ~ di;j =
lndi;j ￿ lndi;j: Here di;j is the distance between locations i and j; which we proxy using the
distance between the capital cities of the US states and Canadian provinces; while lndi;j = 7:69
is the average log distance between all UC pairs.6 This normalization implies that ln ~ di;j is equal
to zero at lndi;j = lndi;j; and simpli￿es interpretation of the ￿2 coe¢ cient, which now expresses
the average e⁄ect of the border for the consumption-RER relationship between any two locations
that are lndi;j kilometers away. The interaction term between the real exchange rate and distance




t to change monotonically with the distance.
Table 2: Estimates of Border E⁄ect: US-Canada
Pooled Fixed e⁄ects Pooled Fixed e⁄ects
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
￿e
j;i
t 0.429*** 0.424*** 0.319*** 0.317***
(0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.027)
￿e
j;i
t ￿ borderi;j -0.451*** -0.447*** -0.348*** -0.345***
(0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.027)
￿e
j;i
t ￿ ln ~ di;j -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.047*** -0.049***

















t ￿ borderi;j -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.029*** -0.028***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
N 56324 56324 56324 56324
R2 0.01 0.0074 0.0262 0.0261
Notes: The dependent variable is relative consumption growth between locations i and j; ￿c
i;j
t : The esti-
mated speci￿cation in columns (i)-(ii) is equation (2.3); while in columns (iii)-(iv) it is equation (2.4). Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate signi￿cance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Our ￿ndings from the OLS and ￿xed e⁄ects estimation of equation (2.3) are presented in
columns (i) and (ii) of Table 2.7 The results in column (i) indicate that the conditional correlation
between the growth rates of RER and relative consumption within US and Canada is positive
and signi￿cant, equal to 0.43 on average. We can also see that the estimated border e⁄ect is
large and economically signi￿cant. In fact, due to this e⁄ect, the consumption-RER correlation
across countries turns negative, equal to ￿0.023 on average. Taking (2.2) as our basic theory of
risk-sharing, these results suggest that relative prices facilitate risk-sharing within countries, but
6We measure distance in kilometers.
7In the ￿xed e⁄ects regression the ￿xed e⁄ects capture the time-invariant, bilateral pair speci￿c e⁄ects.
7impede risk-sharing across countries. The estimates in column (ii) obtained from the ￿xed e⁄ects
regression con￿rm this ￿nding.8
How sensitive are these ￿ndings to the assumption of complete access to capital markets? Many
studies of risk-sharing, both intra-national and international, have relaxed this assumption and
posited the alternative speci￿cation in which at least a fraction of consumers do not make consump-
tion plans based on intertemporal optimization, but rather follow rules of thumb, or equivalently,
have no ability to borrow and lend at all.9 To allow for this, we extend our framework to encom-
pass limited capital market participation. Say that a fraction of households are hand-to-mouth
consumers; that is they are restricted to consume only their current income. These households do
not have access to capital markets, and therefore cannot participate in international risk-sharing.
The testable implication of such a modi￿ed model is that relative consumption growth of these
hand-to-mouth consumers living in any two locations follows their relative income growth. Let
￿y
i;j
t = ￿lnYi;t ￿ ￿lnYj;t denote the relative income growth between locations i and j at time t:
Then the relationship in (2.3) must be modi￿ed to account for the limited participation as follows:
￿c
i;j




t ￿ borderi;j) + ￿3￿e
j;i





t ￿ borderi;j) + ￿6￿y
i;j
t ￿ ln ~ di;j + v
i;j
t (2.4)
Note that the equation speci￿cation in (2.4) allows for the border e⁄ect in the consumption-income
relationship, and for the interaction term between ￿y
i;j
t and the normalized distance measure to




t to change monotonically with the distance. The
results from this estimation are presented in columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 2. We ￿nd that




t in both pooled and ￿xed e⁄ects





t as it declines to about 0.32. At the same time, the border e⁄ect in the consumption-





t for the UC pairs negative and signi￿cant, as before. Overall,
our estimated border e⁄ect in the consumption-real exchange rate risk-sharing remains robust to
the inclusion of income.
2.2.1 What drives the border e⁄ect?
We now investigate the source of the negative border e⁄ect. That is, what explains the negative
relationship between consumption and the real exchange rate across borders? For this purpose we
decompose the real exchange rate into its components as follows. Recall the de￿nition of the real
8Note that the coe¢ cient on the interactive term between RER and log distance indicates that the consumption-
RER correlation declines for the jurisdictions that are located further away from each other.
9See for instance, Crucini (1999), Hess and Shin (2000), Hess and Shin (2010), Kollmann (2009a) and Devereux,





t =Pi;t: Taking logs and ￿rst-di⁄erencing we get
￿lnRER
j;i
t = ￿ln(Pj;t=Pi;t) + ￿lnS
i;j
t ; (2.5)
where the ￿rst term on the right-hand-side captures movements in the the real exchange rate due
to changes in the relative prices, while the second term is due to the movements in the nominal
exchange rate. Table 3 reports the summary statistics for the three terms above.
Table 3: Decomposing RER movements for UC location pairs
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
￿lnRER
j;i
t 13000 0.0009 0.0551 -0.1604 0.1588
￿ln(Pj;t=Pi;t) 13000 0.0007 0.0177 -0.0909 0.0910
￿lnS
i;j
t 13000 0.0002 0.0512 -0.1134 0.0690
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of the presented variables for a
sample of all US-Canada pairs. Obs. refer to the number of observations in
each sample; Mean - sample average; Std. Dev. - sample standard deviation;
Min-sample minimum; Max-sample maximum.
As can be seen from column (iii) the real exchange rate across borders is very volatile and the
majority of this volatility comes from nominal exchange rate movements. At the same time, relative
prices across countries exhibit more volatility than their intra-national counterparts reported in
Table 1: compare the volatility of 1.77% for UC location pairs with 1.17% for UU location pairs
and 0.95% for CC location pairs. Next we amend our speci￿cation in equations (2.3) and (2.4) to
include the growth rate in nominal exchange rates. This allows us to assess the relative contribution
of real exchange rate components ￿relative prices and nominal exchange rate ￿to the consumption-
real exchange rate relationship. The results are presented in Table 4.
Columns (i) and (ii) provide estimates of speci￿cation (2.3), while columns (iii) and (iv) allow
for market segmentation and thus summarize the estimates of speci￿cation (2.4), both amended
to include the nominal exchange rate growth rate between regions i and j. The key result that
stands out from Table 4 is that border e⁄ect turns positive when we control for nominal exchange
rate movements. The coe¢ cient on the nominal exchange rate growth, in turn, is negative and
signi￿cant. This suggests that the negative border e⁄ect estimated in Table 2 is primarily due
to the nominal exchange rate movements. This supports the ￿ndings of Hess and Shin (2010)
and Hadzi-Vaskov (2008) who look at cross country regressions in which di⁄erent bilateral pairs of
countries have di⁄erences in their exchange rate volatility. Thus, without at this stage suggesting
causation, the ￿nding seems to indicate that country pairs with higher nominal exchange rate
volatility will deviate more from the benchmark model of full risk sharing.
To sum up so far, our ￿ndings seem to suggest that the relative price movements facilitate
consumption risk-sharing across Canadian provinces, and across the U.S. states; while they obstruct
consumption risk-sharing across the Canada-US border. Moreover, most of this border e⁄ect can
be attributed to nominal exchange rate variability.
9Table 4: Estimates of the Border E⁄ect: RER Decomposition
Pooled Fixed e⁄ects Pooled Fixed e⁄ects
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
￿e
j;i
t 0.429*** 0.424*** 0.320*** 0.318***
(0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.027)
￿e
j;i
t ￿ borderi;j 0.033 0.043 0.114*** 0.125***
(0.031) (0.035) (0.030) (0.034)
￿e
j;i
t ￿ ln ~ di;j -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.050*** -0.051***















t -0.551*** -0.555*** -0.525*** -0.532***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022)
N 56324 56324 56324 56324
R2 0.020 0.015 0.033 0.033
Notes: The dependent variable is relative consumption growth between locations i and j; ￿c
i;j
t : The es-
timated speci￿cation in columns (i)-(ii) is equation (2.3); while in columns (iii)-(iv) it is equation (2.4).
Both are modi￿ed to include the growth rate of the nominal exchange rate. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate signi￿cance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
2.3 Robustness
2.3.1 Extended sample
We next expand our sample of countries to include Japanese prefectures, Spanish communities and
German bundeslaender. Our data for Germany covers 16 bundeslaender over 1995-2007 period;
for Japan our dataset covers 47 prefectures over 1990-2005 period; while for Spain we have data
for 18 autonomous communities over 1995-2004 period. For each country our dataset includes
information on consumption, price indices and output in each regional unit. Summary statistics
for the extended sample are presented in Table 5.
As before, we report the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for the key variables
of interest. These statistics are reported for the within-country pairs in Germany (Panel 1), Spain
(Panel 2), and Japan (Panel 3); as well as for all cross-country pairs between Canada, US, Germany,
Spain and Japan (Panel 4). Panel 4 also includes summary statistics on the components of the
RER growth rate as shown in equation (2.5). The numbers tell a story similar to that for the
US and Canada: International RER are signi￿cantly more volatile than RER for within-country
pairs and are more volatile than international consumption di⁄erentials. Within-country RER
are much smoother and in fact are less volatile than relative consumption within our group of
countries. Furthermore, as evident from Panel 4, majority of cross￿ border RER ￿ uctuations is due
to movements in the nominal exchange rate. Next, we turn to the regression analysis.
Table 6 presents our estimates of the border e⁄ect for the ￿ve countries comprising our full
sample. Columns (i) and (ii) report our estimates of equations (2.3), while columns (iii) and (iv)
report the estimates for equation (2.4).
10Table 5: Sample summary statistics, extended sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Panel 1: Germany
￿lnCi;t ￿ ￿lnCj;t 2040 0.0039 0.0183 -0.0515 0.0793
￿lnYi;t ￿ ￿lnYj;t 2040 0.0079 0.0410 -0.1696 0.1955
￿lnRER
j;i
t 2040 -0.0019 0.0182 -0.0890 0.0886
Panel 2: Spain
￿lnCi;t ￿ ￿lnCj;t 1377 -0.0035 0.0145 -0.0661 0.0473
￿lnYi;t ￿ ￿lnYj;t 1377 -0.0007 0.1364 -0.6737 0.6718
￿lnRER
j;i
t 1377 -0.0014 0.0046 -0.0171 0.0131
Panel 3: Japan
￿lnCi;t ￿ ￿lnCj;t 16215 0.0002 0.0251 -0.1310 0.1614
￿lnYi;t ￿ ￿lnYj;t 16215 0.0003 0.0224 -0.0946 0.1033
￿lnRER
j;i
t 16215 -0.0002 0.0090 -0.0645 0.0713
Panel 4: All cross-country
￿lnCi;t ￿ ￿lnCj;t 93660 -0.0031 0.0367 -0.3250 0.3662
￿lnYi;t ￿ ￿lnYj;t 93660 -0.0004 0.0602 -0.7456 0.7908
￿lnRER
j;i
t 93660 0.0070 0.0933 -0.2218 0.2272
￿ln(Pj;t=Pi;t) 93660 0.0085 0.0264 -0.1178 0.1270
￿lnS
i;j
t 93660 -0.0015 0.0896 -0.2007 0.2007
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of the presented variables for several samples: all Germany bundeslaen-
der pairs (Panel 1); all Spain autonomous communities pairs (Panel 2); all Japan prefecture pairs (Panel 3); and all
cross-country pairs for the ￿ve countries in our extended sample (Panel 4). Obs. refer to the number of observations
in each sample; Mean - sample average; Std. Dev. - sample standard deviation; Min-sample minimum; Max-sample
maximum.
Consistent with our ￿ndings for the US and Canada, the intra-national consumption-real ex-
change rate correlation for our sample of countries is positive and signi￿cant, equal to about 0.35 in
a benchmark speci￿cation, and to about 0.28 when we control for the e⁄ect of output on consump-
tion. This correlation declines dramatically when we account for the border. In particular, the
cross-country consumption-real exchange rate correlation is ￿ 0.02 when estimated from a pooled
regression, and increases to ￿ 0.01 in the ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation (robust to the inclusion of out-
put). Both correlations are highly signi￿cant. Table 7 con￿rms that the majority of this drop in the
correlation is due to nominal exchange rate movements ￿the coe¢ cient on the variable (￿lnS
i;j
t )
is negative and signi￿cant. It is also worthwhile to note that the coe¢ cient on the ￿e
j;i
t ￿borderi;j
variable is negative and signi￿cant, implying that the movements of cross-border relative prices
(controlling for the nominal exchange rate) also reduce international risk-sharing in our full sample
of countries.
Overall, our empirical analysis provides us with several insights into the consumption-RER
relationship: (i) Within countries this correlation is positive and signi￿cant, implying some amount
of intra-national risk-sharing. This risk-sharing, however, is far from perfect; (ii) Across countries,
the consumption-real exchange rate correlation is signi￿cantly smaller than within countries. It is
in fact negative between US and Canada, and in the full sample of countries; (iii) The majority of
the decline in international risk-sharing relative to the intra-national risk-sharing is due to nominal
exchange rate co-moving negatively with relative consumption; (iv) International relative price
movements (controlling for nominal exchange rate changes) hinder international risk-sharing.
11Table 6: Estimates of Border E⁄ect, all countries
Pooled Fixed e⁄ects Pooled Fixed e⁄ects
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
￿e
j;i
t 0.349*** 0.373*** 0.275*** 0.298***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022)
￿e
j;i
t ￿borderi;j -0.371*** -0.385*** -0.291*** -0.305***
(0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.023)
￿e
j;i
t ￿ln ~ di;j 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.022***

















t ￿ borderi;j -0.022*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
N 156509 156509 156509 156509
R2 0.003 0.003 0.050 0.047
Notes: The dependent variable is relative consumption growth between locations i and j; ￿c
i;j
t : The esti-
mated speci￿cation in columns (i)-(ii) is equation (2.3); while in columns (iii)-(iv) it is equation (2.4). Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate signi￿cance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
2.3.2 Country heterogeneity
In the regression speci￿cations (2.3) and (2.4) the e⁄ect of the border on C-RER correlation,
as captured by the interactive term on the RER with the border dummy, is measured relative
to the average C-RER correlation in the intra-country pairs. Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009)
argue that in the presence of cross-country heterogeneity in the distribution of within-country price
di⁄erentials and consumption di⁄erentials, such benchmark is arbitrary and can lead to misleading
results. In particular, in this case, the border coe¢ cient may capture the joint e⁄ect of the border
and cross-country heterogeneity in C-RER correlation.





be country-speci￿c. In particular, we amend the regression speci￿cation in equation (2.4) with the
product terms of ￿e
j;i
t with a set of dummy variables, each identifying within-country jurisdiction
pairs in each country in our sample. In all cases we use within US state pairs as the benchmark.
For instance, for US-Canada case, we include in the regression (2.4) an interactive term of ￿e
j;i
t
with a dummy variable that equals one for all province pairs within Canada. The coe¢ cient on this
interactive term will give us the change in the intra-national C-RER when transitioning from US
state pairs to Canadian province pairs. The coe¢ cient on the interactive term between ￿e
j;i
t and
border dummy, as before, will give us the e⁄ect of the border on C-RER correlation, except now
we can estimate the e⁄ect of the border crossing from the perspective of each individual country in
our sample.
Table 8 reports our results for the US-Canada sample and for the extended sample of 5 coun-
tries.10 For completeness, panel (a) summarizes our earlier results from the ￿xed e⁄ects regressions
10Detailed estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
12Table 7: Estimates of the Border E⁄ect: RER Decomposition, all countries
































Notes: The dependent variable is relative consumption growth between locations i
and j; ￿c
i;j
t : The estimated speci￿cation in column (i) is equation (2.3), while in
column (ii) is equation (2.4). Both are modi￿ed to include the growth rate of the
nominal exchange rate. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and ***
indicate signi￿cance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
where we used the average correlation in the intra-country pairs as the benchmark for gauging
the border e⁄ect (see columns (ii) and (iv) in Tables 2 and 6). Panel (b) presents the estimation
results that allow for country heterogeneity. We report the results from the speci￿cation with hand-
to-mouth consumers (columns labelled "with ￿y
i;j
t ") and with homogeneous consumers (columns
labelled "no ￿y
i;j
t ").11 All regressions include jurisdiction-pairs ￿xed e⁄ects.
Our results reveal some amount of heterogeneity across our sample of countries. However, some
common patterns emerge. First, intra-national C-RER correlations are consistently positive, with
the US and Spain showing the highest numbers in our sample, while Germany is characterized by
the lowest correlation.12 Second, international correlations are negative for all countries, except
Spain. The correlations are the lowest (most negative) in Germany.
2.3.3 Exchange rate regime
To further assess the role of the exchange rate in C-RER correlations, we turn to international evi-
dence. In particular, we study a cohort of the 12 European Union member states during 1974-2007
period.13 To evaluate the role of the exchange rate, we split the sample into pre-euro period (1974-
1998) and euro period (1999-2007).14 For each subsample we compute all bilateral correlations
11Speci￿cation with the hand-to-mouth consumers also includes the interactive terms between output growth and
dummy variables that identify within-country jurisdiction pairs for each country in our sample. This allows the
consumption-output growth correlations to be country-speci￿c as well.
12The only exception is Germany in the speci￿cation with no hand-to-mouth consumers, who exhibits negative
intra-national C-RER correlation.
13Data details and sources are provided in the Appendix A.1.
14Greece adopted euro on January 1, 2001. We adjust our calculations accordingly.











Panel (a). Homogeneous benchmark
Intra-national 0.424*** 0.317*** 0.373*** 0.298***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022)
International -0.023*** -0.028*** -0.012*** -0.008***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Panel (b). Heterogeneous benchmarks
Intra-national correlations
US 0.413*** 0.305*** 0.433*** 0.329***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Canada 0.203*** 0.140*** 0.214*** 0.159***








US -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.007** -0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Canada -0.250*** -0.209*** -0.226*** -0.175***







Notes: The dependent variable is relative consumption growth between locations i and j; ￿c
i;j
t : Panel (a)
summarizes the results from columns (ii) and (iv) in Tables 2 and 6. Panel (b) reports the results from a
regression speci￿cation in equation (2.3) ￿column labelled "no ￿y
i;j
t ", and speci￿cation in equation (2.4)
￿column labelled "with ￿y
i;j
t ", both modi￿ed to include product terms between ￿e
j;i
t and dummies that
identify all within country pairs for Canada, Germany, Japan and Spain. Within US state pairs are used as
benchmark. All regressions include jurisdiction pairs ￿xed e⁄ects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*,**, and *** indicate signi￿cance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
of relative consumption growth with the growth rate in the RER for each country. The average
correlations for each country and each sub-period are reported in Table 9. A clear contrast arises
between the two periods: In the pre-euro period, the C-RER correlation is negative, on average,
across countries, equal to -0.12. The same correlation turns positive in the euro period and is equal
to 0.03.
These results support our earlier ￿ndings on the role of exchange rate ￿ uctuations for the ￿nding
of negative correlation between relative consumption growth and RER growth.15
15We recognize that besides the exchange rate regime, other factors could have also contributed to the increase in
the C-RER correlation in the second sub-period. For instance, the degree of ￿nancial integration could have risen,
or policy coordination could have increased in the latter period between the EU members. However, the evidence in
this subsection, together with intra-national comparisons suggest to us that the exchange rate is an important part
of the story.
14Table 9: International C-RER correlation: Fixed vs ￿ exible regime
















2.4 An alternative measure of risk-sharing and the role of the nominal exchange
rate
Up to now, we have assumed that the benchmark for e¢ cient risk-sharing in the data is that
relative consumption growth rates across any two locations should be positively associated with
the real exchange rate, independent of other variables. But these tests do not give a metric for
the degree to which risk-sharing fails in the data, nor the extent to which the border (or the
nominal exchange rate) contributes to this failure. Here we follow in the spirit of (Engel and
Rogers (1996)) in constructing a measure of the degree to which the border accounts for the failure





t and obtain its standard deviation in the time-series.17 This gives us a
cross-section of such standard deviations. If our choice of ￿ is correct, then with full risk-sharing
this statistic would be zero for each bilateral pair.18 The summary statistics of this measure are
reported in panel (i) of Table 10.
Table 10: Alternative meaure of risk-sharing: Summary statistics


















10146 0.0335 0.0156 0.0039 0.1107
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of the presented variables. Obs. refer to the number of observations in
each sample; Mean - sample average; Std. Dev. - sample standard deviation; Min-sample minimum; Max-sample
maximum.
16Engel and Rogers (1996) measure the extent of the failure of the law of one price using the standard deviation
of the price di⁄erentials of similar goods across cities in the US and Canada.









and ￿nd that the results are robust to this alternative measure of risk-sharing.
18We set ￿ = 2, so that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is equal to 0.5 ￿ a standard value in the
literature.












￿mDmm + "i;j; (2.6)
where borderi;j; is as before a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if locations i and
j are in separate countries, and zero otherwise, while "i;j is the regression error term. We also
consider a speci￿cation in which we include log of the distance between locations i and j: To
account for potential heterogeneity across countries in the average volatility of deviations from
perfect risk-sharing, we also include a set of dummies, identifying within-country pairs, Dmm:19
Table 11 reports the results. Panel (i) presents the results without the log distance variable in
the speci￿cation, while panel (ii) - includes the log distance variable. The e⁄ect of the border
is positive and signi￿cant. It means that controlling for country-speci￿c volatility in risk-sharing
measure, there is a greater deviation from e¢ cient risk-sharing when comparing across countries
relative to comparing within countries. This result holds whether we control for distance in our
estimation or not. How important is the border? The average volatility of our risk-sharing measure
is 5.14 percent, while the border coe¢ cient is 2.74 percent, so the border accounts for 53 percent
of the total, after controlling for distance.
Table 11: Alternative meaure of risk-sharing: The role of the border








































0.0116*** 0.0027*** 10146 0.31 0.35
(0.0008) (0.0002)
Notes: This Table presents results from estimating regression speci￿cation (2.6). The dependent variable is noted
in the ￿rst column of the table. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate signi￿cance at
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Can this border e⁄ect be attributed to movements in the nominal exchange rate, as argued
previously? In this example, the test is purely a cross-section one, so we cannot include the nominal
exchange rate as a right-hand side variable. But we can again follow Engel and Rogers (1996) in
using an alternative measure of real exchange rates as the relative real price. To control for the
volatility of the nominal exchange we obtain a measure of the real exchange rate as the relative
foreign to home real price, so that nominal exchange rate does not appear in the calculations.
De￿ne P￿
i =P￿ to be the ratio of the price level in jurisdiction i to the aggregate price in the
foreign country. Similarly, let the home real price be de￿ned as Pj=P, where P is the aggregate
19Note that this is a cross-sectional regression.










Note that for any two locations within the same country, ] RER
j;i
t = Pj;t=Pi;t as before. But for
any two locations in di⁄erent countries, this alternative measure of the real exchange rate does
not contain the nominal exchange rate. Engel and Rogers (1996) used this measure of the real
exchange rate to test the degree to which the border e⁄ect could be attributed to nominal price
stickiness, since if all nominal prices within countries were ￿xed and real exchange rates were fully
accounted for by nominal exchange rate variation, then this measure of the real exchange rate would
be constant, and the border e⁄ect would be insigni￿cant. In the same spirit, this alternative real
exchange rate de￿nition gives us a way in which to assess the degree to which the presence of the
nominal exchange rate accounts for the size of the border in deviations from e¢ cient risk-sharing.
After computing ] RER
j;i
; we repeat the steps above to construct the volatility of our risk-sharing








; where ￿~ e
j;i





t￿1): Panel (ii) of Table 10 presents the summary statistics on this adjusted measure.
Clearly, this measure is less volatile than the original measure based on unadjusted real exchange
rate.20 We then estimate the regression speci￿cation in (2.6) using this adjusted measure of devia-
tions from the perfect risk-sharing. The results are reported in panels (iii) and (iv) of Table 11. We
￿nd that the coe¢ cient on the border dummy is still positive and signi￿cant. But it is substantially
smaller than before. How much does the border matter after we control for the nominal exchange
rate in the calculation of relative prices? From panel (iv), the coe¢ cient on the border dummy is
1.16 percent, while the average volatility of the adjusted risk-sharing measure as reported in Table
10 is 3.35 percent. So the border accounts for 35 percent of the standard deviation. Thus, when
the nominal exchange rate is dropped from the calculation of the relative prices, the contribution
of the border to the average volatility of the risk-sharing measure declines from 53 percent to 35
percent.
We next develop a theoretical framework to shed some light on our empirical ￿ndings.
3 Consumption Risk-Sharing with Sticky Prices
From the previous section, it is apparent that the presence of the nominal exchange rate plays a
key role in empirical tests of the risk sharing relationship between bilateral consumption di⁄erences
and real exchange rate changes. What can account for this? One obvious suggestion is that
goods prices are sticky, and so substantial real exchange rate adjustment, in the short run, can be
20Engel (1999) shows that if preferences are identical across countries and the law of one price holds for traded
goods, then the real exchange rate can be exactly written as a ￿ relative-relative￿price, expressing the relative price
of non-traded to traded goods for one country relative to the other country. If we substituted the price index for
traded goods for the aggregate price index for each country, then our measure of the real exchange rate would be
exact under the same conditions as Engel (1999).
17achieved only by nominal exchange rate movement. But while this may facilitate an explanation, it
is not clearly a complete resolution of the problem. Many sticky price models (e.g. Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler, 2002, Devereux and Engel, 2003) exhibit volatile real and nominal exchange rates,
but still have the property that the cross country risk sharing condition between consumption and
real exchange rates holds exactly. On the other hand, many models in the literature which o⁄er
potential resolutions to the Backus Smith puzzle have no role at all for the nominal exchange rate,
and so cannot o⁄er a robust explanation of the ￿ndings of the previous section in the sense that they
imply that eliminating exchange rate volatility by ￿xing the exchange rate between two countries
would have no implications for the empirical tests of risk-sharing.
In this section, we attempt to narrow this gap by combining features of the previous literature
on the Backus Smith puzzle with a fairly standard two country ￿ New Keynesian￿model with gradual
price adjustment. We then ask whether this model exhibits the property that the sign of the C-
RER correlation depends upon the exchange rate regime. That is, we ask whether the apparent
failure of e¢ cient consumption risk sharing can be attributed to the presence of nominal exchange
rate volatility?
As we show, the answer is nuanced, and requires a balance of a number of competing mecha-
nisms. Ultimately, the question can be resolved down to the following requirement. We need to
isolate a mechanism whereby, under a ￿ oating exchange rate system, the preponderance of shocks
produces a negative correlation between relative consumption growth and the real exchange rate,
with this negative correlation itself being accounted for by movements in the nominal exchange rate.
At the same time it should be the case that under the same composition of shocks, a policy that
￿xes the nominal exchange rate changes the sign of the consumption growth and real exchange rate
correlation to a positive number. As we show below, it is not the case that simply adding together
the assumption of price stickiness with a menu of shocks that product a negative correlation can
satisfy this joint desiderata.
To show this, we start with a ￿ bare-bones model￿which has both; a) nominal prices stickiness,
and b) a shock which can produce a negative correlation between consumption growth and the real
exchange rate. In this simple model, we show that the introduction an exchange rate peg which
eliminates nominal exchange rate ￿ exibility cannot resolve the puzzle in the sense that it cannot
reverse the sign of the C-RER correlation. We then introduce an additional mechanism that does
help to achieve this sign reversal. Following this, we develop a more elaborate model, more closely
related to the literature, identifying the key requirements that are necessary to reconcile the model
with the empirical ￿ndings.
3.1 A bare-bones model
To see that sticky prices alone cannot explain the importance of the nominal exchange rate, we take
the simplest possible New Keynesian open economy model; basically an extension of the Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2002) framework. There are two countries, home and foreign. Let the utility of













); ￿ < 1: (3.7)
where Ct is the composite home consumption bundle; and Nt is home labour supply. The variable
￿t represents a preference, or ￿ demand￿shock, changing the intertemporal relative valuation of




Ft ; v ￿ 1,
indicating the possibility for home bias in preferences.22 CHt is the consumption of the home
country composite good, while CFt is consumption of the foreign composite good by the home
household. CHt and CFt are de￿ned over the range of home and foreign di⁄erentiated goods with
elasticity of substitution ￿ between goods. The aggregate (CPI) price index for the home country






F . Demand for individual di⁄erentiated home and foreign goods and home and
foreign composite goods may be obtained from these functions in the usual way. Each ￿rm faces a
demand elasticity of ￿.
In this example, we make the assumption of a complete set of state contingent international



















the foreign CPI, and T =
SP￿
F
PH is the home country terms of trade. Thus, the real exchange rate
becomes Tv￿1
t . Implicit in this condition is the assumption that the law of one price holds, so that
PF = SP￿
F and equivalently for home goods.
Note that in this simple example model, the only way in which there can arise a negative
correlation between relative consumption and the real exchange rate is due to the presence of
country-speci￿c preference shocks ￿t and ￿￿
t: In the extended model below, we depart from this
speci￿cation, explicitly allowing for incomplete ￿nancial markets, so that even in the absence of
preference shocks, there may arise a negative correlation between realized relative consumption
di⁄erences and the real exchange rate.
We assume that households also have access to a market in domestic nominal government bonds,
each of which pays an interest rate of Rt in all states of the world. Thus we can de￿ne an Euler









Foreign households preferences and choices can be de￿ned exactly symmetrically. The foreign
representative household has weight v=2 , (1 ￿ v=2) on the foreign (home) composite good in
preferences.
21See for instance, Stockman and Tesar (1995) for an early application of preference shocks in multi-country DSGE
models.











19Assume that production technologies for all goods are linear in labour, so that for a home good
i, we have production Y (i) as:
YHt(i) = AtNt(i);
where At is a common economy-wide productivity shock that applies to all home ￿rms. Each home
￿rm re-sets its price according to a Calvo pricing policy, where the probability of re-adjusting its










where mt is a stochastic discount factor de￿ned in the Appendix A.2, and Wt is the nominal wage.23
In the aggregate, the price index for the home good then follows the process given by:





The behavior of foreign ￿rms and the foreign good price index may be described analogously.
Assume that the home country monetary authority follows a Taylor rule, which targets the
in￿ ation rate of the home good ￿Ht = PHt
PHt￿1, and the output gap of the home country YHt
~ YHt
, where
YHt is home output (de￿ned below), and ~ YHt is the ￿ exible price (potential) level of home output.
In addition, the monetary rule puts some weight on the nominal exchange rate. Speci￿cally, the
nominal interest rate Rt+1 is set so that:








Here we de￿ne ￿St = St=St￿1 as the gross rate of change of the nominal exchange rate. For very
high values of ￿ > 0; the exchange rate will be e⁄ectively ￿xed.24 The main issue of interest here
will be to contrast the behavior of consumption and real exchange rates for values of ￿ = 0, which
we associate with a regime of in￿ ation targeting in both countries, with a situation where the value
of ￿ goes to a very high positive number.
The foreign monetary authority follows a Taylor rule, but does not directly target the exchange
rate.25















23We assume that there is an optimal subsidy in place that eliminates the distortionary e⁄ect of the price markup.
24Note that this speci￿cation is not associated with the problems of indeterminancy of a ￿xed exchange rate
regime. The nominal exchange rate is fully determined, given an initial value S0: See Benigno, Benigno, and Ghironi
(2007).
25In fact, for the value of corr(￿(c ￿ c
￿);￿RER); it is irrelevant which monetary authority targets the exchange
rate, or whether it is done jointly. It is convenient to focus solely on home country exchange rate targeting, because
this makes the analysis of nominal price adjustment more easy to exposit.












It follows that home country employment (employment for the representative individual home
























The full solution of the model is de￿ned in the Appendix A.2. Here we present the log linear
approximation around an e¢ cient, zero-in￿ ation steady state. As usual in the open economy new
Keynesian models, we may de￿ne an in￿ ation equation as a forward looking relationship in home
and foreign output rates. Let x = ln(Xt=X) be the log deviation of any variable from its steady
state (except for in￿ ation and nominal interest rates, which are in levels).
We can use (3.8), (3.13) and (3.14) to solve for home and foreign consumption and the terms
of trade as a function of aggregate home output. Then substituting into the linear approximation
of (3.10) gives the in￿ ation equation for the home country:
￿Ht = k((￿ + !(1 + D))yHt + yFt!(D ￿ 1) ￿




!(D ￿ v + 1))
￿
"￿
t ￿ (1 + ￿)at) + ￿Et￿Ht+1; (3.15)
where k =
(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿)
￿ ; ! = ￿
2D, and D = ￿v(2 ￿ v) + (1 ￿ v)2.
Likewise, using (3.9) we may de￿ne the home country dynamic IS equation as:
Et(yHt+1 ￿ yHt)(D + 1) + Et(y￿
Ft+1 ￿ y￿
Ft)(D ￿ 1) ￿








t) = !￿1Et (rt ￿ ￿Ht+1); (3.16)
where rt is the home country nominal interest rate, and the interest rate rule implies that: rt =
￿￿￿Ht + ￿y(yt ￿ e yt) + ￿(￿t ￿ ￿t￿1) ￿ ￿(￿Ft ￿ ￿Ht): An equivalent set of conditions hold for the
foreign country, except we de￿ne the foreign interest rate rule as r￿
t = ￿￿￿Ft + ￿y(y￿
t ￿ e y￿
t). Here
￿t is the terms of trade in terms of log deviations. It may be shown that in this simple model, the



















Equations (3.15) and (3.16), and the equivalent for the foreign country, along with the interest
21rate rules, and the terms of trade equation (3.17) may be solved for the path of in￿ ation and output
levels consequent on the shocks to preferences and technology.
First take the case with fully ￿ exible exchange rates, so that ￿ = 0: We may then take the
di⁄erence between (3.15) and its foreign counterpart, and (3.16) and its foreign counterpart, to
express the two country model in terms of di⁄erentials in in￿ ation and output levels, i.e. ￿￿t =
￿Ht ￿ ￿￿
Ft and ￿yt = yHt ￿ yFt as follows:






￿"t ￿ (1 + ￿)￿at + ￿Et￿￿t+1 (3.19)
￿￿￿￿t + ￿y(￿yt ￿ ￿e yt) ￿ Et￿￿t+1 =
￿
D
Et(￿yt+1 ￿ ￿yt) ￿
(v ￿ 1)
D
Et(￿"t+1 ￿ ￿"t) (3.20)
where ￿at = at ￿ a￿
t , ￿"t = "t ￿ "￿
t; and ￿e yt = e yt ￿ e y￿
t.
For illustration purposes, assume that both preference shocks and technology shocks follow
an AR(1) process with persistence ￿. Then there is a simple analytical solution to the system
(3.19)-(3.20). With this, we may then use (3.17) and (3.18) to obtain the solution for relative
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￿t = ￿(v ￿ 1)￿




k(￿￿ ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿D) + ￿y(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
(￿ + ￿D)￿1
￿at (3.22)
where ￿1 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + k(￿ ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿D) + ￿yD(1 ￿ ￿￿).
Shocks to preferences of the home country increase home relative consumption, but cause a terms
of trade appreciation. Shocks to relative home technology also increase home relative consumption,
but cause a terms of trade depreciation. As a result, the correlation between relative consumption
and the real exchange rate (which is v ￿ 1 times the terms of trade) may be negative or positive,
depending upon the dominance of preference shocks relative to technology shocks. From (3.21)
and (3.22) however, it is clear that the correlation will be a⁄ected by the degree of price stickiness.
As the Calvo price rigidity parameter ￿ rises, k falls, and both relative consumption and the terms
of trade are less and less a⁄ected by shocks to technology, particularly if the monetary policy rule
places a low weight on the output gap. As a result, the consumption-real exchange rate correlation
is more likely to be negative, the greater is the degree of price stickiness. Thus, the observations
of deviations from the condition for risk sharing are likely to be a⁄ected by the degree of price
stickiness, and as a consequence, the stance of monetary policy.
22How does a ￿xed exchange rate a⁄ect the correlation between relative consumption and the real
exchange rate? As ￿ ! 1, relative prices can adjust only through domestic and foreign in￿ ation
rates. The log change in the exchange rate, de￿ned as ￿st, must be zero. This implies that
￿st = ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 + ￿Ht ￿ ￿￿
Ht = 0: (3.23)
Thus, the lagged terms of trade acts as a state variable in the model. Substituting (3.23) and (3.17)
into (3.15), we obtain a single equation determining the terms of trade under a ￿xed exchange rate:
￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 = ￿(￿t ￿ e ￿t) + ￿Et(￿t+1 ￿ ￿t) (3.24)
where ￿ = k
(￿D+￿)
￿ , and e ￿t = (￿D + ￿)￿1 [￿(1 + ￿)￿at ￿ (v ￿ 1)￿￿"t], is the natural terms of
trade, or the terms of trade that would obtain under a fully ￿ exible price economy. From (3.24),
the terms of trade will adjust gradually to preference or technology shocks, since adjustment must
take place through domestic in￿ ation di⁄erentials rather than movements in exchange rates. Then,
relative consumption can be solved using (3.18). Intuitively, a ￿xed exchange rate slows down the
response of the terms of trade and relative consumption to both shocks.
What does this simple model imply regarding the consumption-real exchange rate correlation?
We may ￿rst illustrate the impact of preference and technology shocks on relative consumption
and the terms of trade under the two alternative exchange rate regimes in Figure 1. For this
￿gure we use the parameter values in Table 12, which represent a very standard calibration. The
discount factor is set at 0.99. The labor supply elasticity ￿ is set at unity. The value for ￿ is set
to .75, giving an average degree of price stickiness of four quarters. The elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is set at 0.5 so that ￿ = 2: The degree of home bias in preferences is set at v = 1:5, so
that imports are 25 percent of GDP in steady state. The persistence of both shocks is set at 0.9.
Under a ￿xed exchange rate, ￿ is set at a high value so that the nominal exchange rate is constant
(the actual value for ￿ is irrelevant once is it set high enough). As regards the monetary policy
parameters, we set ￿￿ = 1:5, and ￿y = 0:5, the standard parameterization under a Taylor rule.
Table 12: Baseline model calibration
￿ 0.99 ￿ 2 ￿ .01 ￿￿ 1.5
￿ 1 v 1.5 ￿ 0, or lim ￿ ! 1 ￿y 0.5
￿ 0.75 ￿ 0.9
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show respectively the impact of a negative preference shock at home
country on relative consumption and the real exchange rate under in￿ ation targeting and a ￿xed
exchange rate, while ￿gures 1(c) and 1(d) show the equivalent responses following a negative tech-
nology shock. Figures 1(a) and 1(c) show, as indicated by equations (3.21) and (3.22), that
preference shocks and technology shocks have opposite e⁄ects on the real exchange rate, but a⁄ect
consumption in the same direction. A negative correlation between relative consumption and the
23real exchange rate obtains when preference shocks tend to dominate. Figures 1(b) and 1(d) show
that, under a ￿xed exchange rate, the impact on the real exchange rate is substantially dampened.
Following a preference shock the real exchange rate depreciates initially, followed by a further de-
preciation. A technology shock causes an initial appreciation followed by further appreciation.
The impact on relative consumption is magni￿ed in response to a preference shock, since the real
exchange rate cannot adjust to cushion the impact of the shock. On the other hand, the impact of
the technology shock on relative consumption is dampened in a ￿xed exchange rate regime, because
the reduction in the response of the real exchange rate means that there is a smaller response in
relative output levels through expenditure switching from home towards foreign goods.
How does the exchange rate peg a⁄ect the implied consumption real exchange rate correlation?
The sign of the correlation is determined predominantly by the relative volatility of preference
shocks to technology shocks. We choose these relative volatilities so that, given other parameters
in Table 12, the baseline consumption real exchange rate correlation is equal to -0.1 under an
in￿ ation targeting rule, and the volatility of relative consumption is set at 0.02. Table 13 gives the
model￿ s implications for the volatility of consumption, the real exchange rate, and the consumption-
real exchange rate correlation, under an in￿ ation targeting rule and under a ￿xed exchange rate
policy.
Table 13: Policies in the bare-bones model with baseline calibration
Policy stdev(c ￿ c￿) stdev(RER) corr(c ￿ c￿;RER) corr(" ￿ "￿;RER)
￿ = 0 .020 .010 -0.09 -0.30
lim ￿ ! 1 .022 .020 -0.08 -0.22
Under the in￿ ation targeting rules, the volatility of the real exchange rate is approximately 1
percent. A ￿xed exchange rate reduces the volatility of the real exchange rate, but also increases
the volatility of relative consumption. But despite a lower volatility of the real exchange rate, the
consumption-real exchange rate correlation is almost unchanged. Therefore this model, even with
sticky prices, does not capture the empirical property documented in the previous section - ￿xing
the nominal exchange rate has essentially no impact on the C-RER correlation here. Hence, the
negative C-RER correlation is not driven by the nominal exchange rate in this model, even though
prices are sticky, and the exchange rate regime itself does have real e⁄ects.
To see why this model cannot reproduce the empirical importance of the nominal exchange rate
regime we found in the data, take the following decomposition of the consumption ￿real exchange














Recall that the real exchange rate in this simple model is just (v ￿ 1)￿t. The correlation is a
function of the standard deviation of the real exchange rate, the standard deviation of relative
consumption and relative preference shocks, and the correlation of the real exchange rate and
24relative preference shocks. For this correlation to be negative in the ￿rst place, it must obviously
be that corr("t ￿ "￿
t;RERt) < 0, so that demand shocks lead to a real appreciation. The value
for corr("t ￿ "￿
t;RERt) in this example is given in the rightmost column of Table 13. Fixing the
exchange rate reduces the absolute value of corr("t ￿"￿
t;RERt), and in principle does the same for
corr(ct ￿c￿
t;RERt). But the ￿xed exchange rate also reduces
p
var(RERt); as shown in column 3
in Table 13. This tends to make corr(ct￿c￿
t;RERt) more negative. In this example, the ￿rst factor
dominates, so that the value of corr(ct ￿ c￿
t;RERt) does rise when we move to a ￿xed exchange
rate. But the impact is extremely slight. Hence, the bare-bones sticky price model cannot account
for the empirical properties of the C-RER correlation.
How can we amend the model to make it consistent with the empirical ￿ndings? From the
decomposition above, the critical requirement is that corr("t￿"￿
t;RERt) fall by substantially more
relative to the fall in
p
var(RERt) when we move from in￿ ation targeting to ￿xed exchange rates.
One way to facilitate this is by changing the nature of the price adjustment mechanism. Now,
instead of the basic Calvo price adjustment model, we follow Woodford (2003) in assuming that
newly price setting ￿rms at time t must set prices before they observe time t shocks to preferences









￿"t ￿ (1 + ￿)￿at + ￿Et￿￿t+1
￿
(3.26)
This alters the dynamics of the model, because nominal prices cannot immediately adjust to shocks,
even for ￿rms that are re-setting their price. Figure 2 shows how the impulse response to preference
and technology shocks are a⁄ected, both under in￿ ation targeting and under ￿xed exchange rates.
The responses under in￿ ation targeting di⁄er only slightly from those in the baseline model - there
is one period of adjustment after which new prices are updated. Under a ￿xed exchange rate,
however, the real exchange rate cannot adjust at all in response to a shock. This signi￿cantly
reduces the impact of a preference shock on the real exchange rate (panel (b) of Figure 2), thus
reducing the (absolute) value of corr("t ￿ "￿
t;RERt).
Table 14 illustrates the e⁄ect of this alternative price setting assumption (all other parameter
and shock settings are as in Table 12).
Table 14: Policies in the bare-bones model with ex-ante pricing
Policy stdev(c ￿ c￿) stdev(RER) corr(c ￿ c￿;RER) corr(" ￿ "￿;RER)
￿ = 0 .020 .008 -0.10 -0.30
lim ￿ ! 1 .021 .006 0.02 -0.10
As before, moving from in￿ ation targeting to a ￿xed exchange rate increases the volatility of
relative consumption and reduces the volatility of the real exchange rate. But the key di⁄erence
from Table 13 is that the ￿xed exchange rate policy leads to a large increase in corr("￿"￿;RER).
Using the decomposition from (3.25), this leads to a reversal in the sign of corr(c ￿ c￿;RER).
Hence, corr(c ￿ c￿;RER) becomes positive, and in principle, the bare-bones model amended to
25allow for ex-ante price setting can be made consistent with evidence on the importance of the
nominal exchange rate for the consumption-real exchange rate correlation.
3.2 A more general model with incomplete markets and non-traded goods
While the previous model set out the ingredients necessary to account for the importance of the
nominal exchange rate for the consumption-real exchange rate correlation, it did not allow for a
substantial quantitative evaluation of the impact of the exchange rate regime under sticky prices.
For instance, the real exchange rate in that model is driven only by di⁄erences in the composition of
the consumption basket across countries, and in addition, we assumed that international ￿nancial
markets were complete, so that only shocks to preferences could break the direct link between real
exchange rates and relative consumption. In this section, we develop a more elaborate model
which is closer in structure to the current literature. We amend the model to allow for incomplete
￿nancial markets. In addition, the model is driven by di⁄erent types of technology shocks, which
facilitates a negative consumption-real exchange rate correlation even in the absence of preference
shocks. The structure of the model is similar to that of Benigno and Thoenissen (2008).
We brie￿ y sketch out the details of the extended model. Again, there are two countries, home
and foreign, with the population of each country is normalized at unity. Home country preferences
are de￿ned as in (3.7), except, for a) we now abstract from preference shocks, and b) we now assume

















where CTt and CNt represent respectively, the composite consumption of traded and non-traded
goods. The elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods is ’. Traded consump-























where ￿ is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign traded good. Again, in each case,
we assume that consumption sub-aggregates are di⁄erentiated across the consumption of individual
goods, with elasticity of substitution ￿ > 1 across goods.





















where PTt and PNt represent traded and non-traded price levels, and PHt and PFt are retail prices






We assume that international ￿nancial markets are incomplete in the sense that ￿nancial trade
takes place via non-contingent one period nominal bonds. The home budget constraint is given
by:












t+1) indicates home (foreign) currency bond holdings of the home household, Wt
represents the nominal wage, assumed to be equalized across sectors, and ￿t represents pro￿ts








> 0, and represents a transactions cost of foreign bond holdings, which is
a standard approach to induce stationarity in open economy models with incomplete markets (see
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003)).
Households choose consumption of individual goods, labor supply in each sector, and bond
holdings in the usual way. Preferences, budget constraints, and choices of foreign households are
determined in an analogous fashion. The critical di⁄erence from the previous section is that we no
longer employ the full risk sharing condition given by (3.8). Instead, given an integrated world
bond market the state by state risk sharing condition (3.8) is replaced with the conditional risk




















As in the recent literature (see e.g. Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008), Kollmann (2009b),
Benigno and Thoenissen (2008)), this condition implies that up to a ￿rst-order approximation, ex-
pected consumption growth di⁄erentials across countries are positively related to expected changes
in the real exchange rate (conditional on the small portfolio adjustment costs).
Firms in each sector produce using capital and labor. A typical ￿rm in the non-traded (traded)
sector has production function YNt(i) = ANtNNt(i)(1￿￿)KNt(i)￿; (YHt(i) = AHtNHt(i)(1￿￿)KHt(i)￿):
Thus, there are two technology shocks - shocks to the non-traded sector ANt, and to the traded
sector AHt: These shocks play substantially di⁄erent roles in determining the consumption-real
exchange rate correlation. Firms choose their path of investment so as to attain an optimal cap-
ital stock, where the relationship between investment and capital for a non-traded (traded) ￿rm
is KNt+1(i) = (1 ￿ ￿K)KNt(i) + ￿( INt




(:) > 0; ￿
00
(:) < 0, represents adjustment cost technology for investment, where the cost is directly
incurred by the ￿rm. ￿K is the depreciation rate for capital.
Firms in each sector set prices following a Calvo price adjustment speci￿cation, using domestic
households nominal marginal rates of substitution as stochastic discount factors. We allow for
27di⁄erences in the Calvo probabilities of price adjustment across traded and non-traded goods sector
￿rms. The optimal pricing, employment, and investment policy for ￿rms are standard. As before,
we initially illustrate the workings of the model for a standard Calvo pricing framework, and then
show how the assumption of ex-ante pricing a⁄ects the results.
Monetary policy is set in the same way as before. The home country monetary authority follows
an Taylor rule adjusted for nominal exchange rate changes, except that it targets the consumer price
in￿ ation so that the nominal interest rate in the home economy is rt = ￿ + ￿￿￿t + ￿ (St ￿ St￿1);
where ￿t = pt ￿ pt￿1: The foreign monetary rule is given by r￿
t = ￿ + ￿￿￿￿
t.26
Finally, goods market clearing conditions are given as:
YHt = CHt + C￿
Ht + IHt + INt; (3.29)
Y ￿








3.3 The consumption ￿real exchange rate correlation in the extended model
The full linear approximation of the model is more involved than the simple framework of the last
subsection. There are two forward looking in￿ ation equations in each country - for the traded goods
and non-traded goods sector separately. In addition, the real exchange rate is now determined
jointly by movements in the terms of trade and the internal relative price ratio of traded to non-










where ￿ct+1 = ct+1 ￿ ct; etc. The last term on the right hand side represents the wedge in
consumption growth, for given real exchange rates, associated with di⁄erential home country costs
of foreign bond holdings. Again, this represents a very small term, and has no ￿rst-order implication
for the relationship between relative consumption and real exchange rates.
The real exchange rate itself is de￿ned by:
RERt = ￿(￿￿
Nt ￿ ￿Nt) + (1 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ 1)￿t + ￿￿t (3.31)
Here ￿Nt = pNt ￿ pHt; ￿￿
Nt = p￿
Nt ￿ p￿
Ft; and ￿t is the terms of trade as de￿ned before. The real
exchange rate then moves for two reasons. First, cross country di⁄erences in internal relative prices
will a⁄ect RER, so that for instance, if the foreign country relative price of non-traded goods rises
relative to the home country relative price, there will be a home real depreciation. Secondly, as
before, the real exchange rate is a⁄ected by the external terms of trade ￿t.
Unlike the previous model, this extended model allows for a negative correlation between rela-
26The dynamics of the model are changed only slightly if we allow for an output term in the monetary policy rule.
28tive consumption and the real exchange rate, even in the absence of preference shocks. As shown
by Benigno and Thoenissen (2008) and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008), even if relative con-
sumption and real exchange rates are positively correlated in conditional expectations, they may
be ex-post negatively correlated due to the presence of unanticipated shocks which move relative
consumption and the real exchange rate in di⁄erent directions. A clear example in the present
model is a shock to the productivity of the traded good sector. In an incomplete markets setting,
this shock would be expected to raise home consumption relative to foreign consumption, but due
to an increased relative demand for non-traded goods, it can also lead to a real exchange rate
appreciation.
There are two types of shocks in the extended model ￿shocks to productivity in each of the
sectors. We let each shock be AR(1) with persistence ￿N; and ￿T with standard deviations of the
innovations given by ￿N and ￿T; respectively.
We must extend the calibration of Table 12 for this extended model. Table 15 describes the
extended calibration.
Table 15: Extended model calibration





0 -0.75 ￿N 0.7 ￿ 0, or lim ￿ ! 1
￿ 1 ’ .5 v 1.25 ￿N 0.8 ￿N 0.3 ￿T 1.9
￿
0(:)C 0.0025 ￿ 2 ￿K 0.025 ￿T 0.67 ￿T 0.85 ￿￿ 1.5
Again, we set the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption equal to 0.5, and the
labor supply elasticity ￿ = 1. The elasticity of substitution between non-traded and traded goods is
usually estimated to be substantially below unity, so we set ’ = 0:5, midway between the estimates
of Stockman and Tesar (1995) and Mendoza (1995). The elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods is set at ￿ = 2, a benchmark estimate. But the focus of the discussion below
will be on the allowing for variations in ￿ that impact on the C-RER correlation, and in particular
the implications of exchange rate policy for this correlation. We assume that the non-traded goods
sector is 60 percent of GDP, somewhat smaller than that of the US economy, but larger than that
for smaller economies. The degree of home bias in the traded goods sector is set at v = 1:25; half
of the estimate of the previous simple model, since the traded goods sector is much smaller in this
model. We follow Ghironi and Melitz (2005) in setting the elasticity of the bond adjustment cost
equal to 0.0025. The elasticity of the marginal investment adjustment cost function at the steady
state is set to reproduce a ratio of investment to output volatility approximately equal to 3. In the





0 = ￿0:75. The depreciation rate on capital is set to equal
0.025 at quarterly frequency. Capital share in the production function is set to 0.33:
The degree of price rigidity is likely to be substantially higher in the non-traded goods sector
than in the traded goods sector. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) measure the median duration of
￿xed prices in the US service sector to be 5 quarters, and 3 quarters for the non-service sector. We
use these measures to set ￿N = 0:8 and ￿T = 0:67: In measuring the persistence and volatility of
29productivity shocks to the traded and non-traded sector, we follow Benigno and Thoenissen (2008).
They measure traded sector productivity shocks to have persistence 0.85 and standard deviation of
1.9 percent, while non-traded shocks are much less persistent and less volatile, with ￿N = 0:3 and
￿N = 0:7. In addition, we impose the covariance structure of shocks as estimated by Benigno and
Thoenissen (2008).27
3.4 Results with the extended model
Figure 3 presents the impulse responses of consumption and RER to a negative shock to traded
sector productivity in home country in the extended model. Figure 4 reports the corresponding
impulse responses following a negative shock to non-traded sector productivity in the extended
model. Both Figures contrast the dynamics of consumption and RER under ￿ exible and under
￿xed exchange rate regimes (the latter is indicated by letter F).
As panel (a) of Figure 3 illustrates, a negative shock to the traded goods productivity causes a
fall in home relative consumption, and a real exchange rate depreciation. Given the persistence of
shocks, and open international bond markets, these shocks have very persistent e⁄ects in the model.
Panel (b) of the Figure describes the composition of real exchange rate adjustment. Following a
negative productivity shock in traded sector, there is a fall in ￿t; i.e. a terms of trade appreciation,
as the global supply of the home export good is reduced. But at the same time, the income e⁄ect
of the home productivity fall leads to a decline in demand for non-traded goods, which leads to a
fall in ￿Nt, or a rise in ￿￿
Nt￿￿Nt. The ￿rst e⁄ect tends towards a real exchange rate appreciation,
while the second causes a real depreciation. In the baseline model, the second e⁄ect dominates, so
we get a simultaneous depreciation and a fall in relative consumption.
How does ￿xing the exchange rate a⁄ect the response of relative consumption and the real
exchange rate? From the Figure, we see that the impact is very slight. Fixing the exchange
rate leads to a slightly smaller real exchange rate depreciation, and a slightly larger fall in relative
consumption. Panel (b) shows that this is achieved by a slightly greater terms of trade appreciation,
and a slightly smaller relative non-traded goods price increase.
The bottom two panels of Figure 3 make clear why the di⁄erence between the two cases is
so small. In panel (c) we see that the real exchange rate depreciation is achieved by a nominal
depreciation, a disin￿ ation in the non-traded goods sector, which is partially being o⁄set by a
positive in￿ ation in the home goods sector. When the exchange rate is ￿xed, as in panel (d), the
disin￿ ation in the non-traded goods sector is substantially magni￿ed, and the in￿ ation in the home
goods sector is weakened. Hence, we achieve an almost identical outcome for the real exchange
rate due to di⁄erent responses of sectoral in￿ ation rates under ￿xed exchange rates.





0; they estimate the covariance matrix for
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30Figure 4 gives the same breakdown for the case of negative shock to non-traded sector produc-
tivity.28 Such negative shock reduces home relative consumption and causes a real exchange rate
appreciation. Again, the real exchange rate and relative consumption response is similar for a ￿xed
and ￿ exible nominal exchange rate. Under ￿ exible exchange rates, this is achieved primarily by
nominal appreciation. Under ￿xed exchange rate, it is achieved by average in￿ ation rates in excess
of those in the foreign country.29
A number of studies (see, for instance, Heathcote and Perri (2002)) have shown that the the
elasticity of substitution between the traded goods is a key parameter in the class of models con-
sidered above. Therefore, we next investigate how our results are a⁄ected by the trade elasticity.
Figure 5 illustrates the impact of a traded sector productivity shock for a value of ￿ = 5, a higher
elasticity than in the benchmark case. Now there is a smaller terms of trade appreciation, due to
the a higher elasticity of substitution between traded goods. This leads to a substantially greater
real exchange rate depreciation under ￿ exible exchange rates, with the nominal exchange rate play-
ing a greater role. Then ￿xing the exchange rate has a greater impact on the real exchange rate,
because it is harder to achieve the greater depreciation with domestic disin￿ ation.
Figure 6 illustrates the results for the C-RER correlation, when we simulate the model including
both shocks, under the persistence and covariance structure of Table 15. The Figure illustrates the
di⁄erence between the correlation corr(￿(c￿c￿);￿RER), under a ￿xed and ￿ exible exchange rate
regimes, as a function of the size of the trade elasticity ￿. With ￿ close to unity, the correlation is
equal to unity, since we have e⁄ectively complete markets in that case. As ￿ increase, we ￿nd that
the correlation is systematically lower for a ￿ exible exchange rate policy than under ￿xed exchange
rates. However, for values of ￿ in the range of 2, the di⁄erence is very slight. As ￿ rises more and
more, the correlation becomes negative under both exchange rate policies.
Table 16 reports the simulation results for the extended model at the benchmark value of ￿ = 2.
As before, the ￿xed exchange rate leads to a rise in the volatility of consumption and a fall in the
volatility of the real exchange rate. The value of corr(c￿c￿;RER) is slightly positive under ￿xed
exchange rates, and slightly negative under ￿ exible exchange rates.
Table 16: Policies in the extended model
Policy stdev(c ￿ c￿) stdev(RER) corr(c ￿ c￿;RER) stdev(y) stdev(I)
￿ = 0 .85 .64 -0.05 1.65 4.3
lim ￿ ! 1 .92 .42 0.04 1.63 4.2
28For comparison purposes, in this Figure we use the same shock persistence as in Figure 2. In the simulations
below we use the baseline shock persistence for non-traded productivity shocks that is stated in Table 15.
29Note that Figure 4 Panel (d) shows that in￿ ation rates in both sectors are negative. But this is still consistent
with real appreciation because foreign in￿ ation rates are negative also, given the fall in aggregate demand following
the negative home country productivity shock. On average, CPI in￿ ation in the foreign country is lower than that
in the home country, so under a ￿xed exchange rate, the home real exchange rate appreciates.
313.4.1 Ex-ante Pricing in the Extended Model
Figure 6 shows that the extended model can account for a di⁄erence in sign between corr(￿(c ￿
c￿);￿RER) under ￿xed and ￿ exible exchange rates, but this gap is both small and tenuous in the
sense that it is robust only for a relatively small range of values for the trade elasticity ￿. For ￿
to close to unity, the correlation is positive and close to unity whatever the exchange rate regime,
in clear violation of the data. But for ￿ much above 2, the correlation becomes negative, under
both ￿xed and ￿ exible exchange rates.
In the previous section, we showed that the assumption of ex-ante pricing had a signi￿cant e⁄ect
in accounting for the importance of the exchange rate regime for the consumption-real exchange
rate correlation. How does the timing of price setting a⁄ect the results here? We now follow
the same logic as before and alter the pricing technology so that price-adjusting ￿rms in both
sectors have to choose their prices before the current state of the world is known. As before, this
means that in response to either type of shocks, the only component of the real exchange rate
that can adjust immediately is the nominal exchange rate. Figure 7 shows the impulse response
to a negative shock to traded goods technology with the ex-ante price setting assumption. Now,
under a ￿xed exchange rate, the real exchange rate is predetermined within the period. This
alteration signi￿cantly magni￿es the gap between real exchange rate responses under ￿xed and
￿ exible exchange rate regimes.
Figure 8 illustrates the counterpart of Figure 6 for the extended model, in the case of ex-ante
pricing. We now see that there is a signi￿cant gap between corr(￿(c ￿ c￿);￿RER) under ￿xed
and ￿ exible exchange rates. Moreover, this is robust to a large range of values for ￿. In addition,
corr(￿(c ￿ c￿);￿RER) is consistently positive under ￿xed exchange rates, and negative under
￿ exible exchange rates. Hence we may conclude that in principle, the extended model, based on
the elements of incomplete markets, di⁄erential sectoral shocks, sticky prices, and ex-ante price
setting, can account for both the consumption ￿real exchange anomaly, and the empirical feature
that this anomaly seems to be a property of ￿ oating exchange rate regimes.
Table 17 presents the simulation results under ex-ante pricing. Again we see that there is a
substantial impact of the exchange rate regime on the consumption real exchange rate correlation.
Table 17: Policies in the extended model with ex-ante pricing
Policy stdev(c ￿ c￿) stdev(RER) corr(c ￿ c￿;RER) stdev(y) stdev(I)
￿ = 0 .79 .51 -0.12 1.51 3.73
lim ￿ ! 1 .90 .37 0.22 1.51 3.72
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the nature of consumption risk sharing within and between countries,
and highlighted the key feature that the deviation from the predictions of consumption risk sharing
32seem to be associated with the presence of nominal exchange rate ￿ exibility. Using both regional
and international data, we showed that a ￿ border dummy￿led to a signi￿cant negative correlation
between relative consumption growth and real exchange rate changes. Moreover, this border
dummy is substantially accounted for by movements in the nominal exchange rate. We then
asked whether this feature of the data was consistent with the results of standard sticky price
open economy models, in which real allocations are a⁄ected by the exchange rate regime. We
argue that the standard model is not consistent with empirical observations, whether we focus on
a simple ￿ bare bones￿model, or a more elaborate multi-sector model featuring incomplete markets
and endogenous capital accumulation. The key di¢ culty in explaining the reversal of the sign of
the consumption real exchange rate correlation between ￿xed and ￿ exible exchange rate regimes is
that in the standard model, the behavior of the real exchange rate is not fundamentally di⁄erent
between ￿xed and ￿ oating exchange rates, since prices are forward looking, and ￿xing exchange
rates gives rise to greater nominal price adjustment in response to shocks. Adjusting the standard
model to incorporate ex-ante price setting however signi￿cantly improves the ability of the model
to explain the data. In that case, we found that the consumption real exchange rate correlation
tends to switch signs between ￿ exible and ￿xed exchange rate regimes, and that this is a robust
property of the model.
While we have outlined one mechanism which can account for the importance of the nominal
exchange rate for the observed consumption real exchange rate correlation, we are hesitant to
claim that this provides a full account of the importance of the exchange rate in cross country
risk sharing. The main reason is that this model entirely fails to explain the observed volatility of
real exchange rates. This failure is quite standard in the literature (see Benigno and Thoenissen
(2008), for instance). From Table 1, it is clear that relative price variability is much larger when
calculated between regions in di⁄erent countries than when comparing across regions within a
country. To the extent that this is an implication of ￿ exible exchange rates, this should imply
both that real exchange rate volatility falls by orders of magnitude when comparing ￿xed and
￿ exible exchange rates, and that real exchange rate volatility is substantially larger than relative
consumption volatility. Neither property comes out of the models presented in the paper. Thus,
we may conclude from the models developed above that while it is possible to provide an account
of the factors under which the consumption ￿real exchange rate correlation should depend on the
nominal exchange rate, absent a full explanation of di⁄erential real exchange rate volatility across
nominal exchange rate regimes (i.e. the classic Mussa (1986) paradox), the full explanation remains
incomplete at present.
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36Figure 1: Impulse responses in the bare-bones model
Notes: The ￿gures present the impulse responses of home country￿ s relative consumption and RER
to preference and technology shocks in the bare-bones model under benchmark calibration. Panels
on the left ((a) and (c)) refer to the in￿ ation targeting regime, while panels one the right ((b) and
(d)) are the responses under a ￿xed exchange rate regime.
37Figure 2: Impulse responses in the bare-bones model with ex-ante pricing
Notes: The ￿gures present the impulse responses of home country￿ s relative consumption and RER
to preference and technology shocks in the bare-bones model with ex-ante pricing. Panels on the
left ((a) and (c)) refer to the in￿ ation targeting regime, while panels one the right ((b) and (d))
are the responses under a ￿xed exchange rate regime.
38Figure 3: Impulse responses following a negative shock to T sector productivity in the extended
model
Notes: The ￿gures present the impulse responses of home country￿ s relative consumption and RER
to a negative traded-sector productivity shock in the extended model. Panels on the top present
responses under both in￿ ation targeting regime and under a ￿xed exchange rate regime (denoted
by letter F). Panels on the bottom show the responses of nominal exchange rate and sectoral
in￿ ation rates under in￿ ation targeting (panel (c)) and ￿xed exchange rate (panel (d)) regimes.
39Figure 4: Impulse responses following a negative shock to N sector productivity in the extended
model
Notes: The ￿gures present the impulse responses of home country￿ s relative consumption and
RER to a negative nontraded-sector productivity shock in the extended model. Panels on the top
present responses under both in￿ ation targeting regime and under a ￿xed exchange rate regime
(denoted by letter F). Panels on the bottom show the responses of nominal exchange rate and
sectoral in￿ ation rates under in￿ ation targeting (panel (c)) and ￿xed exchange rate (panel (d))
regimes.
40Figure 5: Impulse responses following a negative shock to T sector productivity in the extended
model, ￿ = 5
Notes: The ￿gures present the impulse responses of home country￿ s relative consumption and RER
to a negative traded-sector productivity shock in the extended model with parameter ￿ = 5. Panels
on the top present responses under both in￿ ation targeting regime and under a ￿xed exchange rate
regime (denoted by letter F). Panels on the bottom show the responses of nominal exchange rate
and sectoral in￿ ation rates under in￿ ation targeting (panel (c)) and ￿xed exchange rate (panel (d))
regimes.
41Figure 6: Consumption-RER correlation under ￿ exible and ￿xed ER regimes: Sensitivity to trade
elasticity
Notes: The ￿gure presents a plot of C-RER correlation from the extended model for various values
of parameter ￿: Correlations are presented under both in￿ ation targeting and ￿xed exchange rate
regimes.
42Figure 7: Impulse responses following a negative shock to T sector productivity in the extended
model, ex-ante pricing
Notes: The ￿gures present the impulse responses of home country￿ s relative consumption and RER
to a negative traded-sector productivity shock in the extended model with ex-ante pricing. Panels
on the top present responses under both in￿ ation targeting regime and under a ￿xed exchange rate
regime (denoted by letter F). Panels on the bottom show the responses of nominal exchange rate
and sectoral in￿ ation rates under in￿ ation targeting (panel (c)) and ￿xed exchange rate (panel (d))
regimes.
43Figure 8: Consumption-RER correlation under ￿ exible and ￿xed ER regimes, with ex-ente pricing:
Sensitivity to trade elasticity
Notes: The ￿gure presents a plot of C-RER correlation from the extended model with ex-ante
pricing for various values of parameter ￿: Correlations are presented under both in￿ ation targeting




Canada: For Canada our data includes series for consumption and prices for 10 provinces and 3
territories over 1981-2007 period. All provincial data is obtained from CANSIM. For prices we used
CANSIM Table 326-0021 "Consumer Price Index, by province"; for consumption, we used "Per-
sonal expenditure on consumer goods and services, Chained (2002) dollars" series. We converted
consumption into real per capita terms by dividing the original series by CPI and population.
Germany: Our data for Germany covers 16 bundeslander over 1995-2007 period. Consumption
series are obtained from Regional Accounts database collected by Statistische ˜mter des Bundes und
der L￿nder. The series is called "Private consumption expenditure - price-settled, concatenated
- for each inhabitants in Germany 1991 to 2006 after Federal states year index (2000 = 100)".
Price data is from GENESIS-Tabelle: 61111-0010. The series name is "Verbraucherpreisindex f￿r
Deutschland, Verbraucherpreisindex (2005=100)".
Japan: Our data for Japan covers 47 prefectures over 1990-2005 period. All series are from
"The Annual Report on Prefectural Accounts" published by ESRI. Consumption series is "Private
household and nonpro￿t consumption, real, constant prices 2000". For prices we used "GDP
De￿ ator: Expenditure, Constant Price 2000" series. Consumption data is converted into per capita
terms.
Spain: Our data for Spain covers 18 provinces over 1995-2004 period. All series are from Spanish
National Statistics Institute. For consumption we used "Household Final Consumption Expenditure
by Autonomous Communities". Consumption is converted into per capita terms. For prices we
used "Consumer Price Index by Autonomous Communities, Spain, Annual Means" with several
base years, 1992, 2001, and 2006, which we converted into a common 2001 base year.
US: Data on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by state is available from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). Consumption series are not available at the state level for the U.S. As in Del Negro
(2002), private consumption is calculated as total retail sales in state i times the ratio of total retail
sales to total consumption in the US. The data on total personal consumption expenditures is
obtained from the NIPA Table published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Total retail sales
numbers are published in Sales & Marketing Management￿ s Annual ￿Survey of Buying Power￿(and
reproduced in the Statistical Abstract of the United States). Up until the 1999 Survey, the data
correspond to the previous calendar year. Starting in 2000, the Survey data correspond to the year
in which they were published. This leads to a break in the data (missing data for 1999). CPI data
is not available at the state level for the U.S.30 We use data from Del Negro (2002) up to 1995.
From 1996 onwards, we follow del Negro￿ s procedure as closely as possible to extend the series.
30Gross state product de￿ ators currently in use are constructed taking into account di⁄erences in the product mix
of states, but using national price data.
A1A.1.2 International data
To perform analysis in Section 2.3.3 we use a sample of 12 European Union (EU) member states
during 1974-2007 period. The aggregate series for consumption are taken from Penn World Table
6.2 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2006). In particular, we used "Real gross domestic product per
capita: CGDP" series in combination with "Consumption Share of CGDP: CC" series to obtain our
measure of real per capita consumption for each country. The components of the RER are obtained
from the following sources: (i) nominal exchange rate series are period averages calculated as local
currency units per US $, and are from IMF￿ s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database; (ii)
prices for EU countries in our sample are obtained from SourceOECD database and are consumer
price index (CPI) series with base year of 2005.
A.2 Model derivations
Preferences of the home country are de￿ned as in (3.7) of the text, where the composite consumption




Ft ; v ￿ 1: In turn, CH and CF are de￿ned over the range of
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The household￿ s implicit labour supply is determined by the condition:
C￿￿
t Wt = PtN
￿
t (A1)

















Foreign household preferences and choices can be de￿ned exactly symmetrically. The foreign
A2representative household has weight v=2 , (1 ￿ v=2) on the foreign (home) composite good in
preferences.
Firm i in the home economy uses the production function:
Yt(i) = AtNt(i); (A4)
The home ￿rm has period t pro￿ts de￿ned by ￿t(i) = PHt(i)Yt(i) ￿ WtHt(i)(1 ￿ st), where st is a
wage subsidy o⁄ered to each home ￿rm by the home government, ￿nanced with lump-sum taxation.
When it can adjust its price, the home ￿rm sets the new price, denoted e PHt(i); so as to maximize the

















All home ￿rms that can adjust their price choose the same price. In the aggregate, the price index
for the home good then follows the process given by:





The optimal subsidy will be set so as to o⁄set the monopoly markup exactly, so that s = 1=￿ will
obtain in each country for all periods.
The home country monetary policy follows a modi￿ed Taylor rule, given by equation (3.12).
The foreign monetary authority follows an analogous rule, except it does not target the nominal
exchange rate.
Each home country ￿rm i faces demand for its good from home consumers, foreign consumers





















Let x = ln(Xt=X) be the log deviation of any variable from its steady state (except for in￿ ation
and nominal interest rates, which are in levels). Taking a linear approximation of (A1), (3.10)
and (3.11) around the zero in￿ ation steady state, we derive the standard forward looking in￿ ation
equation, given by:
￿Ht = k(￿yHt + ￿ct + (1 ￿
v
2




Using (A2), (3.13) aggregated across all ￿rms i, and the equivalent for the foreign country, we
A3can solve for ct and ￿t in terms of yHt; y￿






































Here, we de￿ne D = ￿v(2 ￿ v) + (1 ￿ v)2. Then, using (A9) -(A11), re-writing (A8) , we have
￿Ht = k[(￿ + !(1 + D))yHt + yFt!(D ￿ 1)) + #("t ￿ "￿
t) ￿ (1 + ￿)at] + ￿Et￿Ht+1 (A12)
where ! = ￿=2D, and # =
(2￿v)(v(￿￿1)+1)
2D . Thus, domestic in￿ ation is driven by both home and
foreign output, preference shocks, and home productivity shocks.
In a similar manner, we can derive the ￿ dynamic IS equation￿ , using (A9)-(A11) and (3.9). This
gives
Et(yHt+1 ￿ yHt)(D + 1) + Et(y￿
Ft+1 ￿ y￿
Ft)(D ￿ 1) (A13)
￿Et("t+1 ￿ "t)





(D ￿ v + 1)
￿
= !￿1Et (rt ￿ ￿Ht+1)
An identical set of derivations gives the equations for the foreign economy as:
￿￿
Ft = k[(￿ + !(1 + D))yFt + yHt!(D ￿ 1)) ￿ #("t ￿ "￿
t) ￿ (1 + ￿)a￿
t] + ￿Et￿￿
Ft+1
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This system may be solved for the variables yHt;yFt;￿Ht; and ￿￿
Ft. Following this, we may
solve for (3.21)-(3.22) in the text.
A4